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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 A Pennsylvania law firm, A Dragon Associates, and its 
clients, Kirk and Janet Mitzel, challenge the district court's 
application of the New Jersey State Court Contingency Fee Rule to 
a two-million-dollar settlement received by the Mitzels in a case 
Dragon filed for them in federal court in New Jersey.  They argue 
that the district court erred in applying New Jersey rather than 
Pennsylvania law, and, in the alternative, that even if the New 
Jersey rule is applicable, Dragon is entitled to an increased fee 
under the terms of the rule because of the extraordinary time and 
effort it devoted to this case.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  As none of the defendants have filed briefs, this 
matter is before us on appellants' brief only.  Although the 
3 
appeal was filed on behalf of both Dragon and the Mitzels, we 
will treat only Dragon as the appellant. 
I. 
 Kirk Mitzel was severely injured at a construction site 
in New Jersey when a steel beam on which he was working collapsed 
and fell 26 feet to the ground.  Mitzel and his wife, Janet, were 
Pennsylvania residents at the time and retained Dragon to pursue 
worker's compensation and personal injury claims on their behalf. 
On July 26, 1990, the Mitzels signed a contingency fee agreement 
with Dragon in which the law firm agreed to represent them in 
return for 40% of any net recovery.  At some point after signing 
this agreement, but before the complaint was filed, the Mitzels 
moved to North Dakota. 
 Dragon filed a complaint on December 30, 1991 in the 
District Court of New Jersey based on diversity jurisdiction, 
naming as defendants the primary and general contractors and the 
companies that designed the equipment and materials involved in 
the accident.  Two attorneys from the firm were admitted pro hac 
vice to the District Court of New Jersey on May 18, 1992, 
pursuant to the district court's Local Rule 4(c). 
 Dragon asserts that during the following two-and-a-half 
years it invested over 5100 attorney hours in discovery, taking 
nineteen depositions, accumulating fifty-two expandable files of 
documents that are over twenty-two feet thick, arguing nearly 
twenty oral and written motions, reviewing hundreds of thousands 
of records, and consulting more than ten experts.  It also claims 
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to have incurred considerable costs in travelling to Pittsburgh 
and Orlando to inspect documents. 
   Ultimately, in mid-1994 the defendants offered the 
Mitzels two million dollars, and Dragon volunteered to reduce its 
contingency fee from 40% to one-third in order to facilitate a 
settlement at this amount.  The Mitzels agreed and, on July 25, 
1994, filed a motion with the district court asking it to confirm 
the settlement and approve the one-third counsel fee in the 
amount of $648,403.28.  The motion was referred to a magistrate 
judge, who instead recommended application of New Jersey Court 
Rule 1:21-7, and a counsel fee award of $435,181.47.  The 
district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
A. 
Choice of Law 
 New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7(c), which sets a schedule 
of maximum limits on the contingency fees that New Jersey 
attorneys can collect in tort litigation, provides: 
In any matter where a client's claim for 
damages is based upon the alleged tortious 
conduct of another, . . . an attorney shall 
not contract for, charge, or collect a 
contingent fee in excess of the following 
limits: 
(1) 33_% on the first $250,000 recovered;  
(2) 25% on the next $250,000 recovered;  
(3) 20% on the next $500,000 recovered; and 
(4) on all amounts recovered in excess of the 
above by application for reasonable fee in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 




N.J. Court Rules, 1969, R. 1:21-7(c).  Paragraph (f), referred to 
in subparagraph (4) above, provides that "[i]f at the conclusion 
of a matter an attorney considers the fee permitted by paragraph 
(c) to be inadequate, an application on written notice to the 
client may be made to the Assignment Judge for the hearing and 
determining of a reasonable fee in light of all the 
circumstances."  R. 1:21-7(f).   
 The New Jersey district court has incorporated New 
Jersey's contingency fee rule into its local rules through Local 
Rule 4(c), which provides that "[a] lawyer admitted pro hac vice 
[to the federal court] is deemed to have agreed to take no fee in 
any tort case in excess of the New Jersey State Court Contingency 
Fee Rule (N.J. Court Rules, 1969, R. 1:21-7 as amended)."   
 Dragon argues that the district court erred in holding 
that New Jersey law rather than Pennsylvania law was applicable 
to its decision as to the amount of the contingency fee. 
Pennsylvania courts will uphold contingency fee agreements 
voluntarily entered into by the parties as long as they are not 
excessive and do not take "inequitable advantage of the payer." 
Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d 910, 919 (Pa. 1963).  A one-third 
contingency fee is not considered excessive, see id., and fees as 
high as 40% have been enforced by Pennsylvania courts.  See, 
e.g., Oliastro v. Borough of Ellwood City, 486 A.2d 966 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984).  We apply plenary review to the district 
court's decision that New Jersey law is applicable here.  See 
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Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth. of Camden, 49 F.3d 915, 
919 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 Dragon presents the choice as one between Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey law, but it has apparently failed to consider the 
possibility that under the rules established by Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, an attorney's fee 
issue affecting the allocation of funds between attorney and 
client presented in a diversity case is a matter of procedure 
governed by the law of the forum. 
 Generally, the right of a party or an attorney to 
recover attorney's fees from another party in a diversity action 
is a matter of substantive state law.  See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975); Abrams 
v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1224 (3d Cir. 1995); Montgomery 
Ward & Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51, 55-58 (3d Cir. 
1977); see also 1A James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice ¶ O.309[1], at 3109-10 & n.46 (2d ed. 1995).  In 
contrast, contingency fee agreements have been treated 
differently. 
 Contingency fee agreements apportion resources between 
plaintiffs and their counsel rather than plaintiffs and 
defendants, and therefore are collateral to the substantive 
merits of lawsuits in a way that awards of attorney's fees 
between parties are not.  Furthermore, because of the imbalance 
of power that may exist between client and attorney, we have held 
that "contingency fee agreements are of special concern to the 
courts," Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108 (3d Cir. 
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1979), and fall within a court's "supervisory power over the 
members of its bar."  Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 
141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973); see Dunn, 602 
F.2d at 1110 n.8. 
 In Elder v. Metro. Freight Carriers, Inc., 543 F.2d 513 
(3d Cir. 1976), this court was faced with an attorney's challenge 
to a federal court's limitation of his contingency fee under 
facts  strikingly similar to those before us.  Mrs. Elder, the 
widow of a New York resident killed in an accident in New Jersey, 
filed suit in New Jersey federal court seeking recovery under 
state tort law.  Id. at 515.  Both Mrs. Elder and her lawyer were 
residents of New York and they had signed a fee agreement there 
promising the attorney a one-third contingency fee.  The lawyer 
was admitted pro hac vice to the New Jersey district court, where 
the suit proceeded.  After some discovery, the parties agreed to 
a settlement.  Id.  The New York Surrogate Court approved 
distribution of the proceeds to the widow and children, and set 
the counsel fees pursuant to the one-third agreement, which would 
have led to a fee substantially in excess of the amount allowable 
under the New Jersey rule.  A proposed order for payment of the 
one-third fee was then presented for approval to the district 
court.  It declined to follow New York law and instead reduced 
the contingency fee under the formula set forth in New Jersey 
Court Rule 1:21-7, which was then, as now, incorporated into the 
district court's local rules.  Id. at 515-16. 
 Counsel appealed to this court, and we affirmed the 
district court's decision.  Id. at 517-19.  We rejected an 
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argument, proffered by Dragon here as well, that we should apply 
the choice of law analysis of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  We reasoned as follows:  "Rules 
regulating contingent fees pertain to conduct of members of the 
bar, not to substantive law which determines the existence or 
parameters of a cause of action.  Such rules are designed to 
promote the efficient disposition of litigation and enhance the 
public's confidence in the bar."  Id. at 519.  After noting that 
federal courts have the power to prescribe requirements for 
admissions before them and to discipline attorneys who have been 
admitted to practice before them, we stated that "such rules are 
of deep concern to the court which promulgated them," and 
concluded "[w]hen local rules of a federal district court are 
questioned, it is doubtful that the choice of law doctrines of 
the forum state come into play."  Id.2 
 Under this reasoning, contingency fee agreements in 
diversity cases are to be treated as matters of procedure 
governed by federal law.  We nonetheless proceed to analyze the 
district court's choice of law decision, a step we also took in 
Elder.  We hold that, even assuming arguendo that the issue were 
a matter of state law under the Erie test, an application of New 
Jersey choice of law principles would mandate application of New 
                     
2We are not persuaded by Dragon's attempt to distinguish Elder on 
the ground that Elder involved a conflicting order from a New 
York Surrogate court.  That fact was not relevant to, and 
certainly not dispositive of, this court's analysis of the 
conflict of law issue regarding the amount of the counsel fee. 
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Jersey law to the contingency fee agreement and thus lead to the 
same result.  See Elder, 543 F.2d at 519.   
 New Jersey law considers that matters relating to 
attorney's fees fall within the sphere of the state's "paramount 
concern with its courts," id. at 519.  The New Jersey view is 
clear and express: 
It is a virtually axiomatic principle of 
conflicts of law that the procedural law of 
the forum applies even to causes of action 
governed by a different jurisdiction's 
substantive law. . . .  Court rules 
regulating attorney fees are not only clearly 
procedural but have also expressly been so 
declared. 
Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 1113, 1120 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 583 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1990); see also State v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 95 A.2d 715, 717 (N.J. 1953) ("From the outset in New 
Jersey, following English precedents, the allowance of costs and 
counsel fees had been uniformly considered by the courts of this 
state to be a matter of procedure rather than of substantive 
law.").  
 Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not 
err in applying New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7 or its local federal 
court counterpart to the Mitzels' contingent fee agreement. 
B. 
Reasonableness of the Fee Awarded 
 Dragon contends that even if the district court was 
bound to follow the New Jersey contingency fee rule, it failed to 
award "reasonable" compensation.  Dragon recognizes that we 
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review the district court's order in this respect only for an 
abuse of discretion.   
 Under Rule 1:21-7(f), a court may increase a 
contingency fee above the maximum limits in the rule on 
application by the attorney and written notice to the client. The 
language of the rule makes the polestar "a reasonable fee in 
light of all the circumstances."  The New Jersey caselaw 
instructs that the attorney seeking an increased fee must 
demonstrate that 
(1) the fee allowed under the rule is not 
reasonable compensation for the services 
actually rendered, and (2) the case presented 
problems which required exceptional skills 
beyond that normally encountered in such 
cases or the case was unusually time 
consuming. 
Wurtzel v. Werres, 493 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), 
cert. denied, 508 A.2d 223 (N.J. 1985); accord Anderson v. 
Conley, 501 A.2d 1057, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).   
  In considering Dragon's application for a one-third 
contingency fee, the magistrate judge distinguished earlier New 
Jersey cases that granted fees above those established by Rule 
1:21-17(c) on the ground that those adjustments were made at a 
time when the Rule imposed a ten percent cap on judgments over 
$250,000.  See, e.g., Bambi v. Dr. O, 482 A.2d 536, 538 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); Burd v. Hackensack Hosp. Ass'n, 477 
A.2d 843, 844 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); McNelis v. Cohen, 
455 A.2d 1166, 1168 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).  The 
magistrate judge deemed those cases of little precedent, 
particularly in light of the Rule's 1984 amendment increasing the 
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percentages applicable and requiring counsel to make application 
for fees for recoveries above $1 million, R.1:21-7(c)(4). 
 Based on Dragon's application, the magistrate judge 
recommended that Dragon be awarded twenty percent on the amount 
recovered over and above $1 million, explaining "[a]lthough the 
instant case did not present complex or novel legal issues, 
counsel vigorously prosecuted [it] on behalf of his clients, and 
dedicat[ed] a great deal of time to the matter, and secured a 
very good result."  Magistrate's Report and Recommendation at 4. 
Thus the fee recommended by the magistrate judge was calculated 
as:  33_% of the first $250,000 recovered, equaling $83,250; 25% 
of the next $250,000, equaling $62,500; 20% of the next $500,000, 
equaling $100,000; and 20% of the remainder of $947,157.10, 
equaling $189,431.42, leading to a total of $435,181.42.  
 Dragon contends that this award was not sufficient to 
render the total fee "reasonable" and that the fee should have 
been increased to one-third of the entire net recovery.  It 
argues that the fee awarded is not reasonable compensation 
because it amounts to just $85 per attorney hour, out of which 
the firm must still pay overhead and operating expenses.  Dragon 
points to the magistrate judge's finding that counsel "vigorously 
prosecuted [the] case," and to letters from defense counsel in 
this case praising Dragon as "extremely competent," App. at 295, 
and as having done an "excellent job in putting together a 
difficult case."  App. at 172.  Dragon argues that the case was 
"unusually time consuming" as the firm devoted over 5100 attorney 
hours in extensive investigation and discovery.  Additionally, it 
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points to the facts that the Mitzels agree to the increase and 
that Rule 1:21-7, which has not been changed since 1984, fails to 
account for inflation.  Substantially the same arguments were 
considered and rejected by the magistrate judge and the district 
court. 
  Taking at face value Dragon's assertions regarding time 
and effort expended on this case, we are not persuaded that the 
case was so unusual or time-consuming that we should disturb the 
district court's ruling.  The cases cited by Dragon in which one-
third fees were allowed under Rule 1:21-7(f) involved 
considerably more extensive litigation than was involved here. 
See Luchejko v. Membreno, 475 A.2d 696, 697 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1983) (medical malpractice action involving a "number of 
difficult legal issues," as well as extensive discovery, pre-
trial motions, a six-day trial, and post-trial motions); Buckelew 
v. Grossbard, 461 A.2d 590 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.)(medical 
malpractice action which was fully tried, appealed to appellate 
division and then to Supreme Court, and remanded for new trial, 
establishing new rule of law), aff'd, 469 A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1983). 
 Dragon has not cited, nor has this court found, any New 
Jersey case reversing a trial court's finding that an increase 
above Rule 1:21-7's fee schedule was unwarranted.  Cf. Murphy v. 
Mooresville, 333 A.2d 273, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) 
(reversing trial court's denial of fee increase where trial court 
had concluded that increase warranted but had denied it on basis 
of mistaken impression that rule precluded it), cert. denied, 343 
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A.2d 444 (N.J. 1975).  On the other hand, in Bolle v. Community 
Memorial Hosp., 368 A.2d 935, 937-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1976), cert. denied, 377 A.2d 679 (N.J. 1977), the Appellate 
Division reversed a trial court's allowance of a fee above the 
schedule limits for the prosecution of a medical malpractice 
action despite the fact that it admittedly required "time, 
efforts and expertise" and involved not only discovery but a 
five-day trial and an appeal.  See also Wurtzel, 493 A.2d at 613-
16 (reversing trial court's allowance of increased fee for 
prosecution of medical malpractice action involving extensive 
discovery and trial preparation, including consultation and 
preparation of multiple expert witnesses). 
 Dragon cites the opinion in Iskander v. Columbia Cement 
Co., 484 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), as precedent 
for the argument that the magistrate judge and the district judge 
should have considered the New Jersey rule's failure to keep pace 
with inflation and the reduced value of the dollar.  While 
Iskander cited inflation as one of several factors supporting a 
fee increase, the court explicitly cautioned against extending 
that holding beyond circumstances in which "an especially long 
period of time has elapsed between retainer and outcome, such as 
the eight years involved here."  Id. at 355.  Here, in contrast, 
the time between retainer by counsel and settlement was four 
years.  As the court stated in Iskander, the rule's failure to 
keep pace with inflation "can be solved only by the [New Jersey] 
Supreme Court in its rule-making capacity." Id.    
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 Thus, in the absence of other factors indicating that 
an increased fee is warranted, we cannot hold that the district 
court exceeded the considerable bounds of its discretion. 
C. 
 Throughout its brief, Dragon has called to our 
attention the Mitzels' agreement to Dragon's receipt of the 
larger fee.  Indeed, the Mitzels filed the notice of appeal along 
with Dragon, challenging the district court's fee award, even 
though a reversal would mean that the Mitzels' recovery would be 
substantially reduced.  As the magistrate judge noted, if Dragon 
were awarded the fee it requested, it would receive $648,403.28, 
instead of the $435,181.47 awarded by the district court. 
 In this posture of the case, we are acutely 
uncomfortable with the lack of an opposing party on the appeal. 
Undoubtedly, the defendants have no interest in how the 
settlement fund is divided between plaintiffs and their 
attorneys.  The only ones who stand to lose if Dragon gets the 
increased fee it is seeking are the Mitzels themselves, and the 
difference to them is $213,221.81, a considerable sum in any 
financial circumstances.  Any time the attorney's fee and the 
client's recovery come from a fixed fund of money, a "significant 
conflict of interest" arises between attorney and client.  See 
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney's 
Fees at 36 (Oct. 8, 1985), reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985); 
see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 820 (3d Cir.) (discussing 
similar conflict in class action context), cert. denied, 116 S. 
15 
Ct. 88 (1995).  But in this case, by actually petitioning the 
court for an increase in its fee, Dragon has brought that 
conflict into stark relief.   
 The premise behind Rule 1:21-7 is that attorneys and 
their clients do not have equal bargaining power, and that 
clients consequently need protection from the courts with respect 
to contingent fee agreements.  See Kingman v. Finnerty, 486 A.2d 
342, 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); American Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 316 A.2d 19, 24-25 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), aff'd 330 A.2d 350 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1974).  Numerous provisions of the Rule are included to protect 
clients' interests.  Illustrative are those requiring the 
attorney to advise the client of the option to retain the 
attorney under an arrangement for compensation on the basis of 
the reasonable value of the services, 1:21-7(b), and mandating 
that any application for an increase be made on "written notice 
to the client," 1:21-7(f). 
 We have no reason to assume that there has been any 
overreaching by Dragon or that the Mitzels have not been fully 
advised of their rights.  We assume that the Mitzels joined in 
bringing this appeal out of a sense of gratitude to Dragon and a 
commitment to their earlier contractual fee arrangement. 
Nonetheless, it is because there is an inherent conflict of 
interest in this situation, but see New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.8(j)(2) (contingency fee contracts 
excepted from general prohibition on conflicts of interest 
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between lawyer and client), that we have treated this appeal as 
if filed by Dragon alone.3 
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the district court. 
 
                               
 
                     
3We have no desire to enter into the debate about contingency 
fees currently underway in legal circles and particularly in New 
Jersey, where regulation of contingency fees is apparently the 
strictest in the country.  It has been reported that a New Jersey 
state senate committee has discussed proposals for abolition of 
contingency fees, whereas the 1994 report of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice, since tabled, 
recommended amending Rule 1:21-7 to increase the contingency fees 
allowed.  See generally Robert J. Kerekes, The Crisis of 
Congested Courts, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 489, 498 n.39 (1994); 
Martin L. Haines, Contingent Fee System in Need of Shakeup, N.J. 
L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at 18; Martin L. Haines, Time to Rethink 
Contingent Fee Caps, N.J. L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at 17; Tess 
Brennan, Proposed Contingency-Fee Revision Tabled, N.J. L.J., 
Apr. 11, 1994, at 8. 
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